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FORUM: COMMENT

The Administrative State, Front and Center:
Studying Law and Administration in
Postwar America
REUEL E. SCHILLER

I. Blinded by Brown
More than any other case from the postwar period, Brown v. Board of
Education has captured the attention of historians and the public alike.
The case itself, and the NAACP's campaign that led to it, have been the
subject of books and articles beyond counting.' In many history textbooks
it is the only court case mentioned between the end of World War II and
the early 1960s. 2 It is one of a handful of cases that is recognized by the
1. A search of the system-wide catalog of the libraries of the University of California
reveals eighty-one entries for books with "Brown v. Board of Education" in the title. Only
eleven contain the words "Roe" and "Wade"; seven contain the words "Plessy" and "Ferguson"; and seven contain "Marbury" and "Madison." Only the words "Dred Scott" come
close to Brown, generating seventy-seven entries. The Library of Congress subject heading
"Topeka (Kan) Board of Ed-Trials, Litigation, etc" has forty-three entries, including twelve
under the subheading "juvenile literature."
2. See Daniel J. Boorstin and Brooks Mather Kelley, A History of the United States (Needham, Mass.: Prentice Hall, 1996), 705-71 (Brown is the only judicial decision mentioned in
the section entitled "Postwar Problems, 1945-1960"); Paul Boyer, Boyer's American Nation
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001) (chaps. on the "Cold War" and on "Society after World
War II" mention Brown and Sweat v. Painter,but no other cases); Andrew Cayton, Elisabeth
Israels Perry, and Allan M. Winkler, America.: Pathways to the Present (Needham, Mass.:
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public at large and is surely the only Supreme Court case that has its own
National Historic Site.3
The intense focus on this single case is not without reason. While recent years have seen a debate about the importance of Brown in actually
promoting desegregation, 4 no one doubts that it is a potent symbol of the
major elements of postwar liberalism. The case demonstrated the increasing
commitment of national institutions to pluralism and racial egalitarianism.
It presaged the Warren Court's reconceptualization of the Supreme Court's
role as the protector of certain kinds of civil rights and civil liberties. It was
also a potent bellwether for the increasing importance of federal instituPrentice Hall, 1995) (Brown is only Supreme Court decision from the 1950s that is mentioned); Gary Nash, American Odyssey: The United States in the Twentieth Century (New

York: Glencoe/McGraw-Hill, 1999) (Brown is the only judicial decision from the 1950s that
is mentioned, although the book does discuss the trial of the Hollywood Ten). These textbooks
are four of the six most popular high school American history textbooks according to the
American Textbook Council. www.historytextbooks.org/adoptions.htm. College textbooks
are not appreciably better. Alan Brinkley's The Unfinished Nation mentions no cases other
than Brown in its chapters on the postwar period. See Alan Brinkley, The Unfinished Nation:
A Concise History of the United States, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001), 844-913.
Another leading college text, America, Past and Present, mentions Yates v. United States,

but otherwise focuses solely on Brown. Robert A. Divine, T. H. Breen, George Fredrickson,
R. Hal Williams, America, Pastand Present, 3rd ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 881.
As Mary Dudziak has noted, even legal history texts, which obviously discuss more than
just Brown in their sections in the postwar period, have the unfortunate tendency to segregate
the race cases and the anticommunism cases from one another. Mary L. Dudziak, "Brown
as a Cold War Case," Journalof American History 91 (2004): 32. As both Lee and Tani's
articles indicate, these cases need to be woven together as part of the narrative of postwar
legal history.
3. http://www.nps.gov/brvb/. The courthouse in Saint Louis where the trials in the Dred
Scott case were held is also a National Historic Site. However, this site is not devoted exclusively to Dred Scott. It instead memorializes the many links that the courthouse has to slavery,
including the slave auctions that occurred there and its relationship to the Underground Railroad. It also has exhibitions on Virginia Minor's 1870 challenge to women's disfranchisement,
nineteenth-century law in general, and the architecture of historic courthouses. http://www
.nps.gov/jeff/planyourvisit/och.htm.
4. Michael Klarman and Gerald Rosenberg are the two leading Brown skeptics. See Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 42-71;
Michael Klarman, "Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement," Virginia Law
Review 80 (1994): 7; Michael Klarman, "How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash
Thesis," Journal of American History 81 (1994): 81; Michael Klarman, From Jim Crow to
Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2005), 344-442. For some impassioned defenses of Brown, see David J.
Garrow, "Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v. Board of Education," Virginia Law Review 80 (1994): 151; Mark Tushnet, "The Significance of Brown v.

Board of Education," ibid., 173; and Paul Finkelman, "Civil Rights in Historical Context:
In Defense of Brown," Harvard Law Review 118 (2005): 973.
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tions in public policy creation. Finally, Brown established a model for what
has been called "structural reform litigation" in which interest groups use
litigation campaigns to affect public policy by bringing executive and, to
a lesser extent, legislative institutions under on-going judicial control.'
Nevertheless, Brown's dominance of the narrative of postwar legal history has come with a cost. Just as objects placed next to a blazing light
may be difficult to see, Brown's notoriety has distracted legal historians
from other significant legal-historical events of the postwar period. While
there have been wonderful works of legal history about certain postwar
subjects, 6 legal historians have been largely AWOL as political, cultural,
and social historians have deepened the narrative of postwar American
history. Surely the rise of consumer culture, the growth of suburbanization,
and the resurgence of domesticity, to name just three subjects successfully
of postwar history, have legal components
incorporated into the narrative
7
investigating.
worth
are
that
5. The germinal works discussing the rise of structural reform litigation are Abram Chayes,
"The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation," HarvardLaw Review 89 (1976): 1281 and
Owen Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978). A
contemporary, less sanguine, view of structural reform litigation is Ross Sandier and David
Schoenbrod, Democracy by Decree: What Happens When Courts Run Government (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).
6. Two areas that have received scholarly attention are anticommunism and legal thought.
On anticommunism see Michal R. Belknap, Cold War PoliticalJustice: The Smith Act,
the Communist Party, and American Civil Liberties (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
1977); Stanley I. Kutler, The American Inquisition: Justice and Injustice in the Cold War

(New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); and Arthur J. Sabin, In Calner Times: The Supreme
Courtand Red Monday (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999). On postwar
legal thought see G. Edward White, Patterns of American Legal Thought (Indianapolis:

Bobbs-Merrill, 1978), 136-62; Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-1960 (1986),
145-231; Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1995), 206-99; Laura Kalman, The Strange Careerof Legal Liberalism (New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1996), 22-42; and William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey,
"The Making of Legal Process," HarvardLaw Review 107 (1994): 2031. Of course, more
synthetic surveys of twentieth-century legal history have sections on postwar developments. See Morton Horwitz, The Transformationof American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis

of Legal Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); William E. Nelson, The
Legalist Reformation: Law, Politics, and Ideology in New York, 1920-1980 (Chapel Hill:

University of North Carolina Press, 2001); and Lawrence M. Friedman, American Law in
the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). Friedman has a particularly useful bibliography.
7. On these subjects see Kenneth T. Jackson, The CrabgrassFrontier:The Suburbaniza-

tion of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Elaine Tyler May,
Homeward Bound: American Familiesin the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1988);
Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumer's Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar
America (New York: Knopf, 2003); and Meg Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics:Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
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The largest lacuna (or at least the one that bothers me the most) is the
absence of any sustained legal history of the administrative state. This
historiographic hole is particularly perplexing. No one would disagree
that the growth of the administrative state (including the welfare state) is
one of the key elements of postwar liberalism. Yet its legal dimensions are
profoundly understudied. In the last several decades political historians
have fruitfully turned their attention to the administrative state, 8 yet legal
historians have not followed.9 Elsewhere I have called political historians
to task for ignoring the role of courts in the administrative state. 10 But the
fault is ours as well. Legal historians have not generated a legal history of
the postwar period that includes the interaction of courts and agencies.
Indeed, Brown may have led us astray. The story of Brown-litigators
using the federal courts to bludgeon recalcitrant state actors into creating specific policies-is simply not the manner in which most public
policy was made during the postwar period. Courts were not alone in the
driver seat. They may not even have been in the front of the car. In the
years following World War II administrative agencies created increasing
amounts of law. Postwar legal history must begin to reflect this. The fact
8. For the basic bibliographical references to the so-called "state-building" or "American
Political Development" literature, see Reuel E. Schiller, "Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administration and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945-1970," VanderbiltLaw
Review 53 (2000): 1389, 1393-96. For monographs from this literature that focus on the
postwar period in particular, see Brian Balogh, Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and Public
Participationin American CommercialNuclear Power, 1945-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991); Julian Zelizer, Taxing America: Wilbur D. Mills, Congress,and the

State, 1945-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Jennifer Klein, ForAll
These Rights: Business, Labor, and the Shaping of America's Public-PrivateWelfare State

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Merl E. Reed, Seedtimefor the Modern Civil
Rights Movement: The President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, 1941-1946

(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991); Meg Jacobs "'How About Some
Meat?': The Office of Price Administration, Consumption Politics, and State Building from
the Bottom Up, 1941-1946," Journal of American History 84 (1997): 910-41; as well as
several excellent essays in parts one and two of The Politics of Social Policy in the United

States, ed. Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988).
9. For three legal historians who have truly given the administrative state its due, see
Lucy E. Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of Modern

Immigration Law (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); William J. Novak,
The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill:

University of North Carolina Press, 1996); and Barbara Young Welke, Recasting American Liberty: Gender, Race, Law, and the Railroad Revolution, 1865-1920 (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2001). Of course, none of these books address the postwar
period.
10. Reuel E. Schiller, "'Saint George and the Dragon': Courts and the Administrative
State in Twentieth-Century America" Journalof Policy History 17 (2005): 110.
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that both Sophia Lee and Karen Tani's wonderful articles do so is a cause
for optimism.
Both articles place the administrative state front and center in the legal
history of postwar America. They do so in different ways, each of which
suggests a fruitful path for legal historians who wish to explore the interaction between administration and law in the years following the Second
World War. To simplify: Lee demonstrates that agencies were a completely
independent locus of law creation, even at a constitutional level; Tani shows
how studying the interaction between courts and agencies is crucial to understanding policy development during the postwar period. Using these articles
as a springboard, in the next two sections I will suggest some directions for
legal historians to take as they pursue either approach to this subject.

II. The Untold Administrative Dimension of Legal Liberalism
Lee's narrative is compelling proof of the importance of studying administrative institutions as law-makers. By showing how the NAACP used the
NLRB in its battle for fair employment practices, she not only throws light
on a heretofore unstudied element of the NAACP's campaign for racial
equality. She also shows how, in the years following the Second World
War, agencies became a locus of law creation-a locus that cries out for
further examination by legal historians.
For example, Lee's description of the litigation campaign to outlaw
racial discrimination by unions under the NLRA was only one of several
doctrinal innovations that civil rights litigators pressed on the Board. Two
years prior to Hughes Tool, the Board declared that it would set aside elections in which employers used racially inflammatory rhetoric.11 In 1964, the
year it decided Hughes Tool, the Board held that concerted activities aimed
at promoting non-discriminatory employment practices were protected by
the Act. 2 In 1969, the NAACP and other civil rights organizations argued
before the Board that it should allow unionized African-American workers
to bargain separately with their employer if they believed that their union
was not representing their interests. 3 While the Board rejected that argument, the D.C. Circuit did not. 14 Indeed, that same year the D.C. Circuit
11. Sewell Manufacturing, 138 NLRB 66 (1962).
12. Tanner Motor Livery, 148 NLRB 1402 (1964).
13. See Reuel E. Schiller,"The Emporium Capwell Case: Race, Labor Law, and the Crisis
of Postwar Liberalism," Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law 25 (2004): 129,
145-49.
14. Emporium Capwell, 192 NLRB 173 (1971), reversed and remanded sub nom Western
Addition Community Organization v: NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C.Cir. 1973).
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instructed the Board to find that racial discrimination
by an employer was,
15
in and of itself, a violation of the NLRA.
As with Hughes Tool, none of these innovations had much lasting impact. Some were rejected by higher courts,16 while others, like Hughes
Tool, simply faded away." But the fate of these doctrines is not what was
significant about them, historically speaking. Their significance lies in
the fact that they demonstrate how aggressively civil rights litigators used
administrative agencies to further their goals.
Indeed, there exists an essentially unchronicled legal history of the interaction between the Civil Rights Movement and the administrative state. 8
The "unremitting struggle" that civil rights activists demanded required as
much legal action before agencies as it did before courts.' 9 The short-lived
Fair Employment Practice Committee and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission were obvious places for the NAACP and other groups to
focus their attention, but people within the Civil Rights Movement hardly
limited themselves to agencies that were designed to address their concerns. To do so would have been to profoundly restrict their opportunities
to shape policy through the administrative state. Instead, lawyers in the
Civil Rights Movement used agencies that were not designed to address
issues of racial equality.
For example, the Interstate Commerce Commission was less than two
months old when, in May of 1887, William H. Councill filed a complaint
against the Western and Atlantic Railroad Company after being violently
expelled from an all-white, first-class car as he traveled, with a first-class
ticket, from Chattanooga to Atlanta.2" In Councill's case, as well as in two
others that were brought in the next two years, the Commission held that
the railroad companies violated the Interstate Commerce Act by failing
to provide African-American passengers with accommodations equal to
15. United Packing House, Food, and Allied Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.

1969).
16. Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition Community Organization, 415 U.S. 913
(1975); NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969).
17. Sewell is still good law. See KI (USA) Corp, 309 NLRB 1063 (1992); Zartic, Inc.,

315 NLRB 495 (1994). United Packing House, on the other hand, has been narrowed by the
Board. Jubilee Manufacturing,202 NLRB 272 (1973). Consequently, racial discrimination
rarely serves as the basis for a section 8(a)(3) claim. J. S. Alberici Construction Co., 231
NLRB 1030 (1977); Dispatch Printing Co., 306 NLRB 9 (1992).
18. A notable exception to this is Welke, Recasting American Liberty, particularly chap. 9.
19. This phrase was William Henry Hastie Jr.'s. See Genna Rae McNeil, Groundwork:
Charles Hamilton Houston and the Struggle for Civil Rights (Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 211.
20. Charles A. Lofgren, The Plessy Case: A Legal-HistoricalInterpretation(New York:

Oxford University Press, 1987), 142.
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those of whites. 21 Thus, the ICC created the doctrine of separate but equal
almost a decade before Plessy v. Ferguson was decided.
In the 1880s, this was seen as something of a triumph, since most rail2
roads provided no first-class accommodations for blacks. ' By the end of
World War II, the goals of the litigants had changed substantially, particularly as the ICC backed away from requiring even segregated equality.
Their choice of forums did not change, however. The NAACP continued
litigating before the ICC, ultimately securing in 1950 a decision by the
Supreme Court that the Interstate Commerce Act prohibited segregated
railroad cars.2 1 It also used the ICC as a forum for attacking segregated bus
facilities in the context of the Freedom Rides in 1961 .4 The 1960s also saw
cases brought before the Civil Aeronautics Board to desegregated5 southern
airports and prohibit racial discrimination in air transportation.
Similarly, during the 1960s, civil rights organizations used the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) as a forum for advancing their
agenda of racial egalitarianism. During 1964, organizations participating
in Freedom Summer in Mississippi petitioned the FCC, requesting that the
agency not renew the licenses of white-owned radio and television stations
that refused to carry black-oriented programming or that broadcast biased
information about civil rights activities. 6 As a result, by early 1970s, the
FCC was adjudicating dozens of petitions from African-American listeners
demanding that local programming reflect the interests of all elements of
the community. Indeed, even by the mid-1960s, the simple threat of such
petitions forced southern media outlets to begin, albeit tentatively, to cover
27
civil rights activities.
21. Welke, Recasting American Liberty, 344-48; Lofgren, Plessy Case, 142-44; Catherine A. Barnes, Journeyfrom Jim Crow: The Desegregationof Southern Transit (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1983), 6-7.
22. Note that this was all that Councill and the other early litigants were asking for.
Lofgren, Plessy Case, 142-43; Welke, Recasting American Liberty, 344-45.
23. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950). Barnes, Journey from Jim Crow,
74-76.
24. Barnes, Journeyfrom Jim Crow, 168-75.
25. Ibid., 172; Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 132 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
26. For a tantalizing, but brief, description of these events see Brian Ward, Radio and the
Struggle for Civil Rights in the South (Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 2004), 274-77.
Also see Kay Mills, Changing Channels: The Case That Transformed Television (Jackson:
University Press of Mississippi, 2004). The FCC was exceptionally resistant to considering
such petitions until it was twice rebuked by the D.C. Circuit for its intransigence. Office
of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.Cir. 1966);
Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ 1.FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C.Cir.
1969).
27. Ward, Radio and the Struggle for Civil Rights, 277.

HeinOnline -- 26 Law & Hist. Rev. 421 2008

422

Law and History Review, Summer 2008

All of these instances of administrative law-making involved the civil
rights of African-Americans. However, the growth of the administrative state
during the postwar period provides a plethora of opportunities to study, as
Lee did for the NLRB, the way in which individuals and interest groups
generated policy as they litigated before agencies on a host of subject matters. As Tani demonstrates, anticommunism is an obvious locus for such
studies. The Subversive Activities Control Board, the Attorney General's list,
and countless state equivalents, have already generated some legal-historical
scholarship, but nowhere near enough.2" Similarly, despite an explosion of
historical work about the development of the American welfare state, legal
historians have just begun to explore its legal and doctrinal elements.29 And
what about the administrative entities associated with the other elements
of postwar social change: the federal, state, and local entities that shepherded millions of Americans from the cities into the suburbs; or agencies
that helped to generate consumer culture through loans and subsidies? Or,
what about the actions of less "sexy" agencies, like the Atomic Energy
Commission, the Federal Power Commission, and the Food and Drug Administration, each of which transformed the way they regulated profoundly
30
important areas of the economy in the late 1950s and the early 1960s?
Finally, this focus on the legal aspects of agency actions must reflect
one of Lee's key points: agencies can be constitutional actors. Marbury
v. Madison to the contrary, the growth of the administrative state has, on
occasion, created a demimonde of constitutional interpretation in which
agencies, not courts, are the primary actors. Consider freedom of expression: During the first third of the twentieth century, judicial deference to
administrative action limiting free speech was routine.3 Even as the judiciary asserted itself as the primary guardian of this right, agencies strongly
and successfully asserted their own power to interpret the First Amendment. In the 1930s and 1940s, the NLRB engaged in a struggle with the
judiciary over its power to restrict the speech of employers in the context
28. See note 6, above. Ellen Schrecker's Many are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1998), the definitive narrative history of McCarthyism, discusses
many legal issues.
29. In addition to Tani's piece in this Forum, see Felicia Kornbluh, The Battlefor Welfare
Rights: Politics and Poverty in Modern America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2007), particularly chap. 3, and Martha F. Davis, Brutal Need: Lawyers and the
Welfare Rights Movement, 1960-1973 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).
30. Reuel E. Schiller, "Rulemaking's Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in
the 1960s and 1970s," Administrative Law Review 53 (2001): 1139, 1147-49.
31. Reuel E. Schiller, "Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the
Birth of the Modern First Amendment," Virginia Law Review 86 (2000): 1, 21-51.
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of union representation elections. Even after the Supreme Court explicitly
the agency continued until
prohibited the Board from doing so in 1941,
32
in.
it
reined
appointees
new
and
Congress
Similarly, for most of the twentieth century the FCC (and its predecessor,
the Federal Radio Commission) acted in a constitutional capacity by strictly
3
regulating the content to radio and television broadcasts.1 In the 1920s and
1930s, the agency would revoke licenses of stations that broadcast "distaste34
ful" or even "uninteresting" content. Stations that broadcast political opinions contrary to those of the Roosevelt Administration also found themselves
36
in hot water.35 In 1940, the FCC simply prohibited editorializing. During
the postwar period, the agency overturned its ban on editorializing and instituted the "fairness doctrine" that required stations to broadcast "all sides
of controversial public issues."37 It also denied licenses to stations if their
38
broadcasting did not "sufficiently represent local interests." Each of these
actions was taken without any judicial interference. Indeed, when, in 1987,
the FCC abolished the fairness doctrine and committed itself to a libertarian
(or market driven) conception of free speech, it did so completely on its
own, without any prompting from courts. 9 Whether restricting expression
or not, the agency, not the courts, was the constitutional decision-maker.
Lacking knowledge (or a fecund imagination), I won't hazard a guess at
what other agencies have engaged in such behaviors (perhaps local land-use
agencies with respect to takings, or the SEC with respect to free speech when
it preapproves prospectuses). Instead, let me simply amplify Lee's point:
courts do not have a monopoly on constitutional interpretation. In certain
instances, they don't even have the last word. Accordingly, the rapid growth
of the administrative state during the New Deal and the postwar period gives
legal historians an ample opportunity to tell the story of twentieth-century
extra-judicial constitutionalism.
32. Harry A. Millis and Emily Clark Brown, From the WagnerAct to Taft-Hartley:A Study
of NationalLabor Policy and Labor Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950),
174-78; Reuel E. Schiller, "The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise and the Emergence of
New Deal Administrative Law,"Michigan Law Review 106 (2007): 399, 436-38.
33. Schiller, "Free Speech and Expertise," 43-41, 96-101.
34. Ibid., 45-46.
35. Ibid., 49.
36. Ibid., 50.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., 98.
39. Indeed, in the late 1960s, at the height of the Supreme Court's commitment to libertarian free speech, the Court reaffirmed the FCC's power to restrict and direct the expression
of its licensees. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). For the FCC's abandonment of the fairness doctrine see Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987).
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III. Courts v. Agencies: The Contradictions within Legal Liberalism
Karen Tani's narrative sits at the exceptionally fertile intersection of the
study of anticommunism, the development of the welfare state, and the
rise of rights-based legal thought. While covering a similar period and
touching on some similar issues as Lee's piece, Tani's article has a different institutional focus. She is interested in the interaction of courts and the
administrative state. While courts left Lee's actors alone, allowing the NLRB
to craft the Hughes Tool doctrine with essentially no judicial supervision,
Tani writes about a doctrinal development-the luxuriation of procedural
due process-that pit agencies and courts against each other. Reich's notion of the New Property, she demonstrates, was an explicit reaction to
administrative overreaching. It was created, quite consciously, as a tool to
allow courts to control the administrative process. This story is an example
of another facet of the legal history of the administrative state that has been
profoundly understudied: the relationship between courts and agencies and
how that relationship changed over time. If, as I have argued, legal historians
need to focus more attention on agencies as a locus of policy-creation, then
we also need to understand the relationship between courts and agencies.
How do changes in the way the two institutions interact shape the nature
of the policy they create?
The effect of Goldberg v. Kelly on the welfare state is a potent example
of this phenomena. Tani does a wonderful job of describing the connections among anticommunism, the growth of the welfare state, and judicial
behavior by tracing the emergence of the idea of the New Property from
Barbara Nestor's Social Security claim through Reich's encounter with
anticommunism to the Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg. In doing
so, she demonstrates how the very presence of the welfare state became
an impetus for more judicial control over the administrative process. Not
surprisingly, this control had a profound effect on the institutions of the
welfare state. After all, Goldberg required social service agencies to add
procedural mechanisms. Thus, Tani's narrative can be continued forward
in a manner that shows how the welfare state responded to the Court's
requirements. Faced with limited resources, agency officials mechanized
and bureaucratized the process of applying for government benefits: decisions were made less subjective; procedural rules were enforced strictly;
4
discretion was taken away from agency personnel. 1
Because Goldberg v. Kelly transformed due process law, it would be
surprising if it had not had a profound effect on agency behavior and the
40. Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State (New Haven: Yale University

Press, 1985), 33-34.
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development of the administrative state. Many agency-court interactions,
however, take place on a much more modest scale. Yet exploring these
interactions is nonetheless crucial to understanding the development of
the administrative state. When faced with vague policy pronouncements
from a legislature, courts and agencies frequently collaborate to flesh out
the procedural and substantive dimensions of these mandates. Legal historians must turn their attention to this collaborative process. Consider, for
of the modern
example, the development of one of the main components
41
law.
compensation
disability
federal
state:
welfare
Workers who have paid Social Security taxes or who have been injured
while employed in certain risky professions are entitled to receive federal
benefits if they become disabled. Officials at the Social Security Administration adjudicate thousands of such claims each year. Not surprisingly the
agency has, over the years, developed procedural mechanisms for hearing
these claims. For example, to streamline the process, the agency created
"medical-vocational" guidelines that determine whether a disability exists,
thereby eliminating the need to have vocational experts testify at every
hearing. Similarly, the agency created a particular burden of proof (called
the "true doubt rule"), designed to facilitate the payment of claims in close
cases. Each of these procedural innovations was reviewed by federal circuit courts and, ultimately, by the Supreme Court. The medical-vocational
guidelines were, in most circumstances, allowed, while the true doubt rule
was not.
On their face these cases don't seem to represent the most fascinating
corner of the legal history of the administrative state. Yet considering the
42
importance of Social Security to the modern welfare state, the doctrinal
machinations surrounding its administration should be of interest to legal
historians. The development of both the true doubt rule and the medicalvocational guidelines illustrate the importance of examining the dialogue
that occurs between agencies and courts as they generate public policy.
41. These examples stem from two Supreme Court cases Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S.
458 (1983) and Director,Office of Workers' Compensation Programsv. Greenwich Collier-

ies, 512 U.S. 267 (1994).
42. In a single year the Social Security Administration hears more claims than the federal
courts hear on all subjects within their jurisdiction. (In 2005, 652,011 cases were commenced
before the Social Security Administration. That same year 253,273 civil cases and 92,226
criminal cases were filed in federal district court. Federal courts of appeals heard another
68,473 appeals. Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Supplement. 2006, Table
2.F9; Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Business of the United
States Courts, [2006], pp. 102, 165, 214.) In 2005, almost fifty million people received old
age benefits and seven and a half million people received disability benefits from the Social
Security Administration. The value of these benefits was over $520 billion. SSA, Annual
Statistical Supplement, 2006, p. 2.
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Each rule was created by the agency based on its expert opinion of how
best to administer the disability program. Courts brought different interests
to the table: ones based on more "legal" concerns such as canons of statutory construction and the requirements of due process. A complete legal
history of the administrative state requires historians to understand these
interests and, most importantly, to see how they change over time. Only
by doing this can we generate an accurate picture of how law was created
in the twentieth century.
Consider, for example, judicial attitudes towards administrative expertise during the postwar period. The more a court believed in an agency's
expertise, the less invasive that court would be in reviewing administrative
action. The more suspicious of expertise a court was, the more it would
force agencies to comport their actions to its own notions of what public
policy should be. These notions might be informed by a judge's philosophical predisposition, by his crass political preferences, or by institutional
interests that are autonomous from politics (the desire to promote legal
formalism or institutional prestige, for example). Regardless of their motivation, as courts put less faith in expertise, they become more powerful
actors in the administrative process.
As it happens, the postwar period was a time when the judiciary became
increasingly suspicious of the idea of expertise. Encounters with the administrative manifestations of fascism and Stalinism during the 1940s soured
43
many Americans on efficient, expertise-driven notions of government.
Tani beautifully illustrates how domestic anticommunism had the same
effect. Liberals like Reich and Brennan embraced the notion of the New
Property as a bulwark against an administrative state of which they had
become increasingly distrustful-an administrative state that implemented
the political dictates of McCarthyism rather than the New Deal.
Indeed, this is the key irony that Tani's article illustrates. Postwar liberalism was built on a foundation of both increasing statism (a product of the
New Deal) and increasing rights consciousness (a product of America's
fight against totalitarianism abroad and racial discrimination at home). Yet
these two elements were potentially antagonistic. Tani demonstrates that
the rise of the administrative state stimulated a type of rights consciousness
that was inimical to agency freedom of action. Harlan understood this in
Flemming v. Nestor and sided with the agency. Brennan understood it as
43. Reuel E. Schiller, "Reining-in the Administrative State: World War It and the Decline
of Expert Administration," in Total War and the Law: The American Home Front in World

War II, ed. Daniel Ernst and Victor Jew (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), 185-206; Horwitz,
The Transformation of American Law, 213-46; Edward Purcell, The Crisis of Democratic
Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value (Lexington: University Press of

Kentucky, 1973), 115-78.
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well and, in Goldberg v. Kelly, he chose to side with the individual. As legal
historians study the postwar administrative state in greater detail, they will
see this conflict writ large as agencies and courts interacted, some times
cooperatively, sometimes antagonistically, to create law.
The notion of writing about administrative law or the administrative state
can be a daunting one. Does anybody really have the attention span to
write a legal history of the true doubt rule? Does any one have the attention span to read such a history? The complex administrative state that
emerged after World War 1I has generated doctrinal administrivia that may
be important but is certainly not thrilling. Yet the thrill is in the context. Lee
and Tani's essays place the legal history of the administrative state in the
context of the Civil Rights Movement and anticommunism, of grass-roots
politics and postwar legal thought. These contexts are only the beginning.
All the manifestations of the anxious prosperity of the 1950s-anticommunism, domesticity, civil rights, suburbanization, Beat culture, consumer
culture, behavioralism, and the military industrial complex, to name just 44a
few-affected and were affected by administrative laws and regulations.
If legal historians are to strive for a deeper, richer narrative of postwar legal
history we must begin to draw these connections.
44. Don't believe me about Beat culture? That's just because nobody, to my knowledge,
has examined how licensing regimes (which frequently included restrictions on speech and
conduct) in places like San Francisco and New York allowed certain subcultures to flourish.
Similarly, how many Beat-era writers benefited, like Norman Mailer and Lawrence Ferlinghetti, from the G.I. Bill? See Edward Humes, Over Here: How the G.L Bill Transformed
the American Dream (Orlando: Harcourt, 2006), 154-86. Indeed, there is great potential
in studying the legal facets of the connection between art and the administrative state. See
Donna M. Binkiewicz, Federalizingthe Muse: United States Arts Policy and the National
Endowmentfor the Arts, 1965-1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006);
Richard McKinzie, The New DealforArtists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973);
and Monte Penkower, The Federal Writers' Project:A Study in Government Patronageof
the Arts (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977).
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